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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT
OF FACT REPLY

While the City would have this court believe that chronology does not matter
in this case, it does. Especially as the facts develop in a case and parties react to
~

those developments chronologically. Facts often develop and are reacted to based
on what was known at the time. Through many of the City's responses to the facts
in this case, they assert a fact as if it were "always" known. This is clearly not the
case. Two examples will help clarify. First, the City states: "3.

In March 2006

(and the other relevant time periods for this case), the City's insurer was Utah Risk
Management Mutual Association ("URMMA"); Lyle Kunz was the adjuster for
UR.MMA who handled the plaintiffs' claim." (Brief of Appellees, p. 9). They
further recite this court's prior opinion stating "The opinion itself provides no
facts contradicting the City's statement." (Id. p. 9). It was clear from the court's
statement that, up to the time of the City filing an affidavit in the second motion for
summary judgement qjier the first appeal, it was only a guess as to who URMMA
was. UR.MM.A and their role, and hence, how the Winegars should react to them,
was only a guess. A guess that could have easily been avoided had the City
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followed the statutory language by stating 'as the City's insurer'. Chronology is
important. Especially in how the \'{/inegars would respond, knowing what they
knew al the time.

A second example is the City's misrepresentation of the 'deemed denied'
period. Not only was the 90 day 'deemed denied' period stated twice on the City's
notice of claim form, both parties relied on this as the state of the law throughout
the proceedings, until the City's Reply memorandum in the first motion for
summary judgement was filed in 2011 1• Later, in argument to the court, Winegars
(and the City) understood that the "deemed denied" period at the time of the claim
was, in fact, 60 days, contrary to what the claim from stated and neither party was
claiming differently. At the point in time of argument, it was clear what the
"deemed denied" period was and Winegars were not arguing it was 60 days and so
stated to the court. (Brief of Appellee, p. 18-19). But at the time the claim was
filed and until 2011, Winegars (and possibly the City) believed the "deemed

1

The District Court stated "Both parties initially represented in their memorandum that
the claim would be deemed denied after 90 rather than 60 days. As pointed out in
Springville City's reply memorandum, however, it is undisputable that the statutory
denial period had been changed from 60 days two years before Plantiffs' cause of action
accrued." (Order, R. 512-532). This was not just "old language" on a form though as the
City would have the court believe. They continued to tell claimants this for years after
Winegars filed their claim, even while arguing to the court it had changed to 60 days.
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denied" period was 90 days as stated on the claim form. Winegars responded to
the City under the belief created by the City's statement they had 90 days.

Section B Reply to City's Facts and Issues
Winegars now Reply to the City's 'fact' assertions in Appellees' Brief, section
B. The City asserts "2. The notice of claim file on January 27, 2006 contained no
allegations indicating that the plaintiffs intended to pursue claims against any
Springville City employees individually." (Appellee Brief, p. 8). Yet the City

VJ)

forgets to mention several important factors. First, based on what was known on
January 27, 2006, Winegars described the City's conduct and the individuals as best
they could without the benefit of discovery. It clearly put the City on notice of
what had occurred so they could assess the liability. Winegars did not cite specific
statutes, but the GIA does not require that. The 27 January 2006 notice of claim
form described the conduct 2 (possibly known at the time by the City to be illegal)
of excavating the stream bank and removing trees from Winegars' property which

2

The January 27, 2006 claim form states in part: "They flattened out the brow of the hill
and drove down into the creek. Once in the creek, they took out all the trees along the
bank on one side and then cut the bank back anywhere from 15 to 30 feet from where it
would naturally flow. All of this material was piled on the remaining area of bank and
some of those trees removed as well. They then worked their way up to the logjam and
cleared it. The Crew removed dozens of trees, a few of which [a few](sic) were 15
inches or more in diameter. The creek bank, which was once compact, flat and able to
resist the water flow, was turned into a jumble of sand, rocks, tree branches and stumps."
Appellant's Brief, Addendum B.
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actions were taken, in fact, without the required permits (which the City knew it
did not have), thus making the conduct of the individuals illegal. The City was put
on notice, just as the GIA intended, of the events that took place. Second, while
Winegars questioned whether the City possessed the required permits, they were
assured by the City the work done in the creek was done with the blessing of the
State Department of Water Resources 3, thus another attempt to mislead the
Winegars into a sense that nothing was illegal and the work of the individuals was
proper. Yet it later became clear they knew they needed a permit and did nothing
to obtain it4•
Finally, the amended notice of claim, done in agreement with the City, clearly
gave the best information Winegars had available, at that time, due to the City's
refusal to disclose the names. It states:

3

The April 9, 2006 letter states in part "Finally, we discussed whether the State
Department of Water Resources had been contacted. You felt confident that they had
been contacted but did not have any particulars as to whether a permit had been obtained
or whether any form of authorization had been obtained. If you have any further
information on this, please let me know." (Appellants' Brief), Addendum E. The City
said nothing further on this until depositions when they admitted no contact had been
made.
4
See Appellees' Brief, p.15 of Public Works Director as to the City's knowledge of what
could be done without a permit. Winegars have seen no assertion or evidence from the
City that it ever contacted the State of Utah or the Army Corp of engineers about this
project, before or after, rather just the opposite. No contact was made.
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In our conversation on April 7, Troy Fitzgerald and I discussed what
would happen if these names were not provided. UYe concluded the on!J alternative
1vasjor me to amend nry claim which I submitted to Springville City on January 27,
2006 to include the unidentified employees who participated in the clear cutting of
the stream bank, stream bank removal, diversion of the creek and removal of trees
and timber from the subject property. Based on_your r~fusal to provide me these names, I
hereby amend my claim to include not only Springville City but all the unidentified
employees who participated in any aspect of the work done at the above listed
property, participated in the decision-making to do such work or carried trees or
timber off the property.
(April 24, 2006 Letter from Winegars, Appellants' Brief, Addendum C). (Emphasis
added). Considering the actions of the City in trying to obfuscate the issues throughout the
process, there is a remarkable amount of evidence of the nature of the claim and the facts

\JP

surrounding it thus complying with the requirements of the GIA by putting the City on
notice of nature of the claim.

Paragraph 3 of the City's brief discusses the status of Mr. Lyle Kunz. Again, the City
fails to account for chronology and goes to the heart of the issue as to the City's obligation
to deal fairly with the public. The evidence cited by the City in this paragraph is clear as of
the date it discussed, April 2006. When Mr. Winegar was questioned:

Q. And did you know have an understanding as to who Lyle Kunz was?
J\. I did not. I had been working exclusively with Troy Fitzgerald, [the City
Attorney] and out of the blue got a letter from Lyle Kunz. I assumed he was an
adjustor.

Q. For an insurance company?
.rJ
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A. My assumption was an adjustor, based upon the letter.

(Appellee's Brief, p.10). Whether Mr. Kunz was an independent adjustor, worked for an
insurance company or otherwise was only a guess as pointed out by this court, until the City
filed their second motion for summary judgement, upon which this appeal is taken. Despite
the ease of clarity as envisioned by the statute to state 'we are the City's insurer' for a claims
adjustor's letter coming out of the blue, or stating 'the claim is denied', the City chose to be
ambigious, which goes to the central question, how far can a City go to obstruct the notice
of claim process.
The City further discusses in this paragraph the amended claim 5, whether it was
legally allowable and the "outright denial" by an as-of-then unknown Mr. Kunz. Apparently
this is an effort to argue the Winegars should have reacted to this confusion based on
information that came much later as to who Mr. Kunz actually was.
Again in Paragraph 6, the City avoids the issue of why it would inf01m claimants to
amend a notice of claim if such were not allowed and then later repudiate such agreement.

While the City seems to apparently mock any "explanation" of the facts by putting
quotations around each use of "explain" (which is usually part of helping the court better
understand the case), it fails to address such issues as to why would the City (who most
often has a more extensive understanding of the claims process) would direct a claimant
to amend a claim if there were no legal basis to do so. Later, they repudiate their
direction to amend. Again, this goes to how far a City can go to mislead claimants.

5
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This was clearly relied on by the \'v'inegars (yet only needed because of the City's refusal to
~

provide the individual names as well as having misinformed claimants of a material fact, that
no authorization was obtained from State of Federal authorities to do what they did).
Paragraph 7 discusses the letter sent by the then-unknown Mr. Kunz and clearly
speaks for itself. While the Winegars provide "explanation" as to the chronology the City
would rather ignore, it does reiterate the City's continued refusal to provide names needed
for the notice of claim.

In paragraph 8, the City recites the April 24, 2006 letter which speaks for itself. What
4P

is clear is Mr. Kunz still does not identify himself and it is clear the letter was addressed to
both Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Kunz, as the Winegars did not know who Mr. Kunz was. While
the City characterizes these as "simply letters", they are the best contemporary evidence of
what transpired, other than Mr. Winegar's deposition. If Mr. Fitzgerald (the City attorney)
had not in fact agreed to such an amendment, one would expect a contemporaneous reply
letter from him so stating or an explanation in his deposition, unless this were an attempt to
mislead.
Paragraph 9 cites Mr. Kunz 10 May 2006 letter again failing to identify who he was.
For clarification, Mr. Kunz does not state "that the City" would stand on its denial as claimed
in .Appellees' Brief (Appellees' Brief, p. 13, para 9). Rather Mr. Kunz states "we must
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therefore stand on the original denial .... ", which, had Mr. Kunz' role been stated or known,
likely would have avoided another issue the City chose to confuse.

The City in paragraph 20 seems to imply that the City's director of Public Works, Mr.
Stapley, testimony about what was legal to do in the stream (''We've been told that we can
go in and hand work in the creek and remove debris and so forth" (Appellees' Brief, p.15)) is
somehow ameliorated by his further explanation. In a footnote he states that in an
til

emergency on other occasions, the City had gone in and done work in the stream and then
talked to the State after the fact. The problem with this explanation is there is no evidence
of any emergency other than normal high run off in a debris laden area, that the City never
contacted the State at all and that the individuals' conduct was nothing other than illegal
without proper permits.

Section C Reply to City's Facts and Issues
Winegars contend their facts are cited to, or supported, by a relatively brief record on
appeal, contrary to the City's claim. Further, the City makes some unusual statements
regarding Winegars due diligence attempts in this section which would be clarified by an
"explanation."
First, the City states there was no "first refusal" by it for the names of the employees
involved and requested by the Winegars. It seems to imply that had this request been made
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for the names before the January 27, 2006 claim form was filed, it would have disclosed them.
While the actual evidence of this first refusal may be brief, it is there and had the Winegars
known they could not expect a standard of honesty, justice and fair dealing in their contacts
with the City as was set out in Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 162, 23 Utah 2d 22

(Utah 1969), and should have been e:>,..pected, there likely would have been much more evidence of
all the contacts.
A review of what evidence docs exist though shows the City's argument to be wrong.
Included in the record and cited by the Winegars are the two letters written by Winegars on
April 9, 2006 and April 24, 2006 (Appellants' Brief, Addendum C, E), both written in
response to prior oral communications with the City. While Winegars have more detailed
information about these numerous (prior attempts' to communicate with the City not in the
record that may have been assumed on their part to be clear from the letters, the letters
themselves do mention these contacts. The first letter states in part '(Pursuant to our phone
conversation, you asked me to request in writing information needed." This references a
prior oral communication and the City finally made clear they would not honor oral requests.
While mentioning a prior day, not a date, it does show prior phone communications with the
City and its intransigence in providing information clearly needed for the notice of claim.
The second letter dated April 24, 2006 illustrates the prior communications better and
demonstrates the frustration due to the \X'inegars' rebuffed efforts and the City's continued

12
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acts to hide the ball. It shows this in two parts. The letter says "I [Nlr. Winegar] had been
waiting for your response for several weeks and have left numerous phone messages with no
response." and "I do not have their names and other than obtaining them from one of you, I
have no way to get their names. Clearly, each of you have this information." This evidence,
in the record, shows the due diligence and the frustration of the Winegars in attempting to
contact the City "numerous times" trying to get the needed information and the City's
~

refusal to cooperate.
While it would be nice to have clearer information about these 'numerous' prior
attempts to get the names mentioned in the letters, the City is just wrong that "no evidence"
exists of the prior attempts or Winegars' due diligence in attempting to discover the names.
All the letters, read together, make quite clear the attempts by the Winegars to get the names
and that the City was not going to disclose the names. Further, the claim the City makes of
lack of due diligence by Winegars or that 'had the City been asked prior to the January 27,
2006 notice of claim' they somehow would have disclosed the names to be included on the
claim form, frankly, defies logic. The clear evidence shows the City's refusal to disclose
these names, at all.
Next, the City makes another erroneous claim and attempts to support it with a
statement that is not related to their claim of 'no reliance' at all. The City claims Winegars
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did not rely on the false statement the City made on their notice of claim form that the
'deem denied' period was 90 days rather than the accurate 60 days stating there is no
evidence to support this. Several observations would dictate otherwise. Obviously,
Winegars did not know the information stated two times (once in all capitals) on the notice
~

of claim form was false. Such a prominent statement listed twice is noticed. Second, the
April 9, 2006 letter states in part "The reason I need these names is to amend my claim prior
to the end of April to include these individuals." The end of April is 90 days after January 27,
2006. While it would be nice to have a tidy statement 'We relied on your notice of claim
form' there was, at the time, no reason to doubt the City's written statement. Especially if
the Winegars were to expect honesty, justice and fair dealing in their contacts with the City.
Finally, it is somewhat disingenuous of the City to claim the Winegars did not rely on the
statement (even though references in letters and actions show otherwise) when the City itself
appeared to rely upon it in their filings with the court for four years. Even once it was clear
the 'deemed denied' period was in fact 60 days as they stated to the court in 2011, they
continued to misinform potential claimants it was 90 days.

In an attempt to support their claim, they quote language from oral argument before
the district court. (Appellees' Brief, p. 19). The court asked about whether there was an
issue of whether the deemed denied period was 60 days or 90 days. Mr. Winegar responded
"There is no argument that that is the period that would apply." J\gain, chronology matters
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and Mr. Winegar's response is clear. By the time of oral argument, both sides understood
the City's claim form to be false. There was absolutely no argument that the statute said 60
days and had stated that for almost 2 years, despite the City informing claimants otherwise.
The district court recognized this as well by stating in its order "the parties agreed that the
plaintiffs were not asserting that a 90-day denial period applied rather than the statutory
period of 60 days." It says nothing of reliance at the time the notice of claim form was
submitted.
Finally, the City claims the exact detail of the work done in the stream and discovered
in depositions was not in the record and should not be considered. While it is (discussed
later) for this issue on appeal the detail or order of the work is unlikely relevant or helpful.
What is clear in paragraph 13 of the Citys' statement of their facts though is "Riding received
instructions from Child to remove the logjam, remove the island, capture and remove the
debris out of the creek, and haul it off and dispose of it." 'fhis clearly shows, from the City,
the operations that took place in the stream and becomes important to show the City knew
(Stapley deposition quote, Appellees' Brief, p. 15) they could only do handwork in the creek
without the proper State or Federal permits. By ignoring the Federal and State requirement
for a permit, the employees were engaged in illegal work, not within the scope of their
employment.
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Argument
The City breaks its arguments into five sections and Winegars will reply briefly to

vi
each of these sections, in order.

Section I
Here, the City sets out some of the cases detailing the courts expectations of
compliance with the GIA. Several points merit mention, though in order of presentation
rather than importance. First, the City highlights the words in the Davis case "by plaintiffs"
in reference to strict compliance with the GIA seeming to infer only the plaintiffs have a
burden of strict compliance, and not the City. (Appcllees' Brief, p.23). Y ct this is the exact
question posed by Winegars (Appellants' Brief, pg. 8, Issue 5) as to whether the courts have
an expectation of strict compliance by the City as well. It is clear from the facts of the case
that a succinct statement by the City or its insurer, would have strictly complied with the
statute and thereby avoid much of the confusion they introduced to the process in the
beginning. By merely stating "as the City's insurer, your claim is hereby denied" rather than
requiring the Winegars to guess who Lyle Kunz was based on a chain of assumptions, much
would have been avoided. In trying to convince the court that the March 20, 2006 letter was
a denial, the City states "Nothing in the letter can be interpreted as informing the Winegars
their claims had been approved, and thus the letter can only be construed as informing the
Winegars their claim was denied." (J\ppellees' Brief, p. 25). This twisted logic is exactly why
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the court should require Cities to strictly comply, as well as plaintiffs. It is not difficult to
state "your claim is denied" and "we are the City's insurer."

Next, the City argues that later letters from Mr. Kunz, who was role was clearly at the
time unknown, should fix the City's prior error. What the City fails to address though, is the
issue that this additional party only added additional confusion to process when he failed to
comply with the GIA and identify himself. Again, why didn't the City clarify, at the time,
who Mr. Kunz was so the Wincgars would know the import of his letters. These simple
actions the City could have taken, makes one wonder, combined with their other
misrepresentations, whether this pattern were intentional as it would seem difficult to
unintentionally create so many challenges to a claimant.

Finally, the City again dismisses the amended notice of claim they not only agreed to
at the time, but created the necessity for even needing. If, in fact, the City truly believed the
claim had been denied on March 20, 2006, it begs the question as to why the City would
then later agree to an amended notice of claim in early April of 2006 as evidence by the
unrebutted letter from the Wincgars dated 24 April 2006. The Winegars assert the claim was
never properly denied, the City's now-known insurer was not made known and all parties
were misled by the City's written statement that the deemed denied period was 90 days.
Finally, these facts do not violate the direction given by the court in Monarrez which was
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clear in showing the claim ha<l clearly been denied by operation of statute, without the State
misleading the claimant.

Section II
In this section of Appellees' brief, they discuss the GIA requirement to include
~

names of employees and describe fraudulent of malicious conduct if the claimant seeks to
invoke the statutory allowance for including them in a later action. First, Winegars will
address the City's contention the names of individuals could have been included on either
(or both) claim forms (other than what was done by including "unidentified employees" on
the April 24, 2006 amended notice of claim). As pointed out above (see Winegars reply to
City's facts, section 2, supra), it is disingenuous for the City to contend anything other than
they baldly refused to supply the names of individuals at every attempt the Winegars made 6
to obtain the names and therefore could not be included on any notice of claim form.
Allowing the City to refuse to provide information, which they clearly knew, and then
reward them for it would only encourage others to do the same making it virtual impossible
6

~

Besides the oral declinations mentioned in Winegars' letter of April 9, 2006, Mr. Kunz
stated in his letter on April 20, 2006 "We are not prepared to continue negotiations with
you by providing you the information you have requested in your letter. ... your attorney
can gather this information through the discovery process of the court syster (sic)." In
part, Winegars responded on April 24, 2006 in their amended notice of claim "I requested
the names of the individuals involved because Utah Code Annotated §63-30d401 (3 )(a)(iv) requires me to state the employees names on the claim itself if my claim
could be pursued against them individually, which I believe Utah Code permits." The
City well knew Winegars were considering personal liability as they even cited the
specific statute and likely did not want to disclose for this very reason.

18
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to properly comply with the notice requirements of the GIA in many instances. For the City
to claim "there is no evidence whatsoever" of attempts to learn the names and that Winegars
made no efforts to obtain the individual names is patently false. The main purpose of the
April 9, 2006 letter from the Winegars and prior contacts was to request, in writing (at the
demand of the City), these exact names since all prior oral requests had been ignored or
denied. Yet even when the Winegars complied with this further demand from the City to
put it in writing as they were asked, they were again rebuffed.
Next, the Winegars did in reality name the employees as best they could
("unidentified employees") when they amended the notice of claim form at the City's
direction on April 24, 2006 and included their alleged misconduct of "clear cutting of the
stream bank, stream bank removal, diversion of the creek and removal of trees and timber
~

from the subject property." Most of this description of the conduct was also included in the
January 27, 2006 notice of claim as well. Even though the Winegars were assured by the
City attorney the individuals actions were covered by the proper permits, this turned out to
be just another attempt to mislead. The City had actual notice of the nature of the claim,
specific details of what the individuals did and, while attempts were made to gather the
specific names, Winegars were each time rebuffed and included all they could, "unidentified
employees."
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Section III
The City argues here no estoppel argument should apply and cite extensively to the

Davfr v. Cent. Utah Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT 52. What the City does not address though is
Davfr dealt with a clear failure to properly comply with the GIA, i.e., serve the notice of
claim as was required by the GIA. That is not the case here. This case deals with issues
where Winegars either attempted to comply and did a 'work around' because of the City
(such as naming 'unidentified employees'), or issues not addressed by the GIA (such as the
agreed-to amended notice of claim). The shortcomings alleged by the City fall generally into
two areas, even though there is significant crossover where they cover both areas. The first
area consists of those actions where the GIA does not address the issue in question. The
second area consists of actions where the City affirmatively misled the Wincgars and thus
made it impossible to directly comply. Yet even in this second area, the Winegars often
'worked around' to compensate for the City's actions. The first area examples include:
-The City agreed to an amended notice of claim when the GIA does not address this.
-The City failed to use simple, clear statutory language if they wanted to deny a claim;

vJ

-The City failed to identify their insurer in correspondence with claimants for 4 years
leaving it a guess as to who he was;
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-The City waited over 4 years to allege non-compliance with notice of claim
requirements;

The second area examples include:

-The City agreed to an amended notice of claim when they later argue the claim had
already been denied by the time of the agreement;

-The City repeatedly denied claimants requests for simple information needed to
properly file a claim which created the need for an amendment;
-The City misinformed Winegars, and then others for over 8 years, the 'deemed
denied' period was 90 days rather than the statutory 60 days;
-The City assured Winegars proper permits for the work being done were obtained
when, in fact, they were not;
-The City later repudiated their agreement to amend the notice of claim form;
These actions violate the expectations of honesty, fairness and justice that citizens
should expect from one another and, in accordance with Rice, citizens should expect from
political entities. Where the number and significance of such actions rise to a level, such as
here, where the City has obstructed compliance, introduced so much confusion into the
claims process, and ultimately argue for summary judgment based on the results of their
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misdeeds, they should be estopped from benefitting from their misconduct. The City could
easily have interacted honestly and with fairness towards the Winegars. If it did not have the
proper permits, just say so. If it wanted to deny a claim, just say 'claim denied'. If it wanted
its insurer to do it, just say this is the insurer. If it did not believe a notice of claim could be
amended, just say so. If a claimant needs names to file a claim, supply them. The City had
no need to deal with the Winegars deceptively unless they were trying to avoid liability for
actions that concerned them. This is what Rice states the City cannot do.
Further, the City argues again the Winegars failed to exercise due diligence in

va

obtaining the names of the unknown employees, claiming there is no evidence of due
diligence. Yet, as discussed above, this is simply not true as the letters to the City clearly
show the efforts of the Winegars in attempting to obtain the names. The City also
characterizes the letters written as 'unilateral' yet this is the only evidence available and if the
City had disagreed with any of the described contacts, it would have corrected them in a
contemporaneous reply or in depositions.

Finally, the City discusses the amended notice of claim and Lyle Kunz' 10 May 2006
response to it. Mr. Kunz responded by claiming the 24 J\pril 2006 was not an amended
notice of claim since it was not delivered to the right department. But if it were an amended
notice of claim, he didn't believe there was any significant additional information that would
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cause them to change their posirjon on Liability. He stated he would stand on his 'original
denial'. Unfortunately, this begs the question in several ways. The 'original denial' was not a
denial. Next, \Xlinegars did not know who Mr. Kunz was or that he had any authority to act
for the City. Also, this May 10, 2006 letter contradicted what the City had agreed to do just
~

days before, amend the notice of claim, which made no sense. Finally, this letter was after
the date the City had stated on their notice of claim form the claim was deemed to be denied,
April 27, 2006.
It is interesting the City cites to Rice and then claims the facts in Rice are different than
they are in this case. Winegars do not dispute this. It is the principle of the case in Rice, that
of an expectation of honesty, fair dealing and justice that Winegars cite to, not an
equivalence of factual issues. 'The clear evidence in this case shows a pattern by the City of
misleading, hiding the ball, and failing to comply with its responsibilities under the GIA, all
of which were easily avoidable, and frankly unnecessary, unless the City feared something
else. Yet the City chose to obstruct Winegars attempts to seek redress under the GIA for
damages caused by the City.

Section IV
The City claims in this section the notice of claim form is insufficient because it does
not establish the illegality of the employees' actions or that they went beyond the scope of
their employment in altering the stream and the other actions taken in the notice of claim.
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This is not the purpose of the notice of claim form to establish the legal arguments and the
City's 'requirements for a valid notice of claim form' to be valid goes well beyond the GIA
requirements. \X!hile the GIA states in pertinent part the notice of claim form should
contain the names of the employees, a brief statement of facts, the nature of the claim and
the damages asserted, it does not require the detail to "adequately support the "illegality"
premise" or other items the City argues here. The purpose of the notice of claim form is to
put the City on notice, not to 'prove the case' as the City now argues should have been done
in the notice of claim form.
As for the individuals' actions in the amended complaint, the record does support the
City knew they should not have altered the stream without a permit. Yet these two
individuals did it anyway 7. And more importantly, the removal of the island, alterations to
the stream bank and removing all the trees was done after the logjam had been removed and
any claim of an imminent threat of flooding, if there even was one, was now non-existent.
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition and accompanying Affidavit). 8 This was made clear

7

The City Works director stated only hand work could be done in the stream without a
permit. Mr. Child begrudgingly admitted he would not condone an illegal act by an
employee. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. I 2).
8
The description of actions taken in the stream are in Plantiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement and Winegar Affidavit which
are in the record and clearly set out what actions were taken in the stream by the
individuals along with their own quotes from depositions in the Memorandum. This also
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at Mr. Riding's deposition and quoted in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition that any
concern of flooding was gone. And the State statute the City relies on to claim the exception
for "imminent or actual flooding" exception (U.C.A. §73-3-29), also lists out what should
have happened immediate!J efter, if it were to avail itself of this exception. It also lists the
criminal penalties for altering the stream. While the City has often argued Wincgars do not
have the <right' to bring a criminal cause of action themselves 9, the fact that the actions of
the two employees in significantly altering the stream and removing the island could be a
criminal act, goes to show the willfulness of their actions. The State and Federal
environmental laws do have a purpose and neither the City nor the individ~als can ignore
them with impunity because they seem burdensome. Even had the City actually believed the
bank erosion, due to a years-long debris accumulation, could be considered flooding as they
assert, they fail to address the remainder of U.C.A. §73-3-29 as to what they should have
done after. This is nothing more than an attempt to excuse their improper conduct. The
illegal actions of the individuals is supported by the record and the cause of action against
them should not be dismissed.

shows the order (that the stream alterations were done after the logjam had been
removed, which for this argument, matters).
9
This is not in dispute and the Winegars actually have never asserted this. The criminal
violations have only been mentioned as an issue to show willfulness of the individuals
and their actions in altering the stream.
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Section V
In the City's final section of argument, they claim their actions, and those of the
individuals, are exempt under the GIA as they could be considered to be the management of
"flood waters". First, Wincgars have always contended that the erosion of the bank because
of a long accumulating logjam could not be considered "flood waters". Second, arguendo it
were, once the logjam had been removed and the erosion halted, this argument would no
longer apply. Yet according to Mr. Riding, some of the trees and the island in the stream
were removed after the logjam had been cleared (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition and
accompanying Affidavit, p. 12). What becomes quite apparent is the City knew they needed
a permit but did not want to be bothered with it for this 'minor' work and once the logjam
was cleared, they made significant alterations to the stream and to Winegars property. The
City does not retain immunity for these actions.

Conclusion
The district court erred when it dismissed Winegars amended complaint against the
City and individuals. The long course of misleading actions by the City significantly
hampered \Xlinegars efforts to pursue their claim for the damage caused by the City illegally
altering the stream and bank yet Winegars believe they in fact did comply, despite the City's
efforts to prevent them. This court should overrule the findings of the district court and
remand the case for trial.
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Respectfully submitted, this ~day of January, 2017.

w~~

Wade Winegar
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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